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LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN
CENSORING THE MEDIA OF
MASS COMMUNICATION
JUDGE CHARLES S. DESMOND*
My thesis, so far as I have one, is that there is nothing in Ameri-
man law, constitutional, statutory or conventional, to prevent pre-
censorship for obscenity, and that such pre-censorship, applied reason-
ably and justly and without impingement on the public right to be in-
formed and without destruction of real literary values is not offensive
to the historic American tradition of freedom of publication.
It is remarkable and paradoxical that the United States Supreme
Court while deciding during its long history perhaps two hundred
cases directly or indirectly involving freedom of speech, press and
religion has never announced a comprehensive definition of "freedom
of the press" or indeed, of the other First Amendment freedoms of
speech and religion. When our Bill of Rights was adopted, there were
in the newly-organized United States of America perhaps a hundred
publications that could be called newspapers. There was some pamph-
leteering and no book publishing business worthy of the name. Our
country today boasts more than 10,000 newspapers and some 5,000
periodicals of other sorts, and publishes annually some 12,000 new
book titles. Yet, not only do we not find in our statutory or decisional
law any authoritative statement as to what any of those publications
may be prevented from including in their content-we do not even
have any final declaration by our highest Federal court as to whether
prevention or prohibition of any kind, degree or extent is authorized
by or despite the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Putting it another way and stating baldly the number one question in
this area of the law-does the First Amendment void all attempts at
censorship by government of anything written, printed or pictured?
The failure of our judicial processes, over a period of now one hundred
seventy years, to produce such final and definitive answers, results, of
course, from two distinctive features of our American system of
judging. The first of these causes is the refusal by our courts (at least
our Federal Courts) to give advisory rulings, and their corollary in-
sistence on having a real adversary cause before them before furnish-
ing answers to any questions of law. The second characteristic of
the American judicial process which has resulted in this long failure
to answer so important a legal question is judicial reluctance to decide
*Judge, New York State Supreme Court, 1940. Judge, New York Court of
Appeals, 1940 to present.
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any more than is directly and necessarily involved in the particular
litigation before the court. Since I speak here individually as a lawyer
and, I hope, a student of this general subject, but not authoritatively
as a judge, I am not ready with any complete answer, either. But I
will try to describe and define the question, show how it arose, what
progress has been made toward an .answer, and, just incidentally and
accidentally, hint at solutions.
Censorship, since it necessarily restricts freedom, has always been
and will continue to be unpopular with those who, from principle or
perversity or for profit, insist on unbridled freedom. The censor,
prohibiting what is to him odious, brings onto himself the odium of
the author or publisher of the censored material. Those two public
officials of ancient Rome, called "censors" who first were empowered
to take the census, then broadened their scope to include supervision of
the morals of others, were not popular in their day. But those two
Roman censors were performing a function which governments have
assigned to themselves from early Roman days to our day.
A brief and sketchy history of censorship will serve our purposes at
this point. In classical Greece and Rome there was control by law at
least of seditious and libelous utterances. The Christian Church from
earliest times banned certain writings. In France from the sixteenth
century on, printing was subject to licensing. But it is the conflict
which raged in England over censorship and licensing for centuries
that we are most interested in, for our purpose. The printing press
commenced its work in England in the fifteenth century but there was
no periodical press in anything like modern form till the early seven-
teenth century. For about a century the British Government tried,
never with real success, to enforce press licensing laws. Up to the time
of the American Revolution most of the English prosecutions were for
libel or sedition, but some were for obscenity, as we shall see. In
Britain's American colonies there were, when our Revolution broke out,
about one hundred newspapers of one kind or another, as I have said-
and suppression of such publications by the royal colonial governors was
not unknown. Then came the successful American Revolution, the
ratification of our Federal Constitution, and then the adoption of the
Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
Let us now skip to the present-day problem, and return later to history.
'In our country and our time, few if any attempts are made to
censor mass communication media except as to alleged obscenity in
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movies, magazines, comic books and pocket-size books. Our discussion,
therefore, will be, principally, as to the legal problems surrounding
prior restraint of publication of printed and pictorial material alleged
to be obscene. Peripherally, we will find it necessary to discuss the
closely connected but not identical question of criminal punishment for
obscenity. Also, in such a paper as this, it will be impossible to avoid
policy considerations and it is idle to pretend that one's conclusions
are not influenced by fundamental beliefs and the moral code to which
one subscribes.
Our immediate topic as to the law of censorship of allegedly ob-
scene publications, divides itself into three sub-inquiries:
first, as to whether any and every prior restraint of publication or
distribution is unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution?
second, if there be a negative answer to our first query, what, in
legal theory, is obscenity and who is to define it and apply the defini-
tion?
third, assuming the constitutionality of censorship, are different
standards to be applied to the press, properly so-called, and to other
media?
Of course, if our first question demands an unqualified affirmative
answer, our discussion, if not our troubles, is at an end. And we must
admit that there are plenty of quotations available from impressive
sources (not, however, including any official majority Supreme Court
opinions as I read them) to the effect that all prior restraint is uncon-
stitional under the free speech and free press guarantees of our
Federal Constitution. There is no doubt at all that the First Amend-
ment had for its principal purpose the prevention of previous restraints
in the light of abuses of the past, such as the suppression of news-
papers by the royal colonial governors.' In Patterson v. Colorado,2
Justice Holmes wrote that the main purpose of the First Amendment
was to "prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had
been practiced by other governments." It is plain that he referred to
earlier silencing of political opinions. The GrosJean case3 says no
prior restraints are constitutional but this statement must be read in
the context of the case itself. The question is: what did the First
Amendment mean to its authors? Our Revolutionary forbears had
not forgotten the monopoly on printing given by Henry VII to his
favorite, nor the practice of the Tudor and Stuart kings of controlling
the printed word through licensing, nor Milton's ringing attack on
'Leach v. Carlisle, 258 U.S. 138; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713, 719;
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462; U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334
U.S. 131, 166.
2205 U.S. 454, 462.
3297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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that licensing system in his Areopagitica (1644). Patrick Henry
shouted his fears that Congress might "silence the censures of the
people." As Chief Justice Hughes in 1938 noted in his opinion in
Lovell v. Griffin,4 liberty of the press in the eighteenth century meant
freedom from governmental licensing, that is, the right to publish
without a license what formerly could be printed only with one. Ben-
jamin Franklin, whose 250th birthday we honor this year, said that
liberty of the press is "the liberty of discussing the propriety of public
measures and public opinions." Let me offdr a few historical facts to
show that freedom to express opinion was all that the Founders had
in mind.
The Delaware State Constitution. adopted in 1782 included this:
"The press shall be free to every citizen who undertakes to examine
the official conduct of men acting in a public capacity, and any citizen
may print freely on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that
liberty." The Maryland Constitution of 1776 announced that "freedom
of speech and debates on proceedings- in the Legislature, ought not to
be impeached in any other court or jurisdiction." The Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 pointed out that "Liberty of the press is essential
to freedom in the State." Still earlier, the First Continental Congress
in a Declaration of Rights had described the importance of freedom
of the press, besides advancing truth, science, morality and arts, as
being "its diffusion of liberal sentiments in the administration of
government." One of the reasons advanced for omitting a Bill of
Rights from the Federal Constitution was that the states (not in-
cluding New York) had already safeguarded these freedoms in their
own charters and that the Federal government had nothing to do with
them. An examination of those state constitutions makes it clear that
it was press freedom as to governmental and political questions that
was intended to be protected. When the Federal Constitutional Con-
vention was about to recess, it passed a resolution urging Congress to
propose and procure amendments to the Constitution of the United
States. Among the changes the Convention asked Congress to obtain
was one "that the people have a right to freedom of speech and of
writing and publishing their sentiments; that the freedom of the press
is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and ought not to be violated."
In 1895 the Supreme Court in the Mattox case 5 said that the Constitu-
tion should be interpreted as securing to individuals the rights their
British ancestors had fought for. judge Cooley in his monumental
treatise on Constitutional Limitations6 said that "the evils to be pre-
vented were not censorship of the press merely, but any action of the
4 303 U.S. 444.
5 156 U.S. 237 at 243.
6 See 8th edition, Vol. 2, p. 886.
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government by which it might prevent such free and general discussion
of public matters as seems essential," etc. I have multiplied these quota-
tions deliberately (and many more are available) to prove or at least
illustrate my point that the freedom our Founding Fathers sought was
freedom of discussion, particularly on public questions.
Our Founding Fathers were thus quite aware that it was political
freedom that required a free press (there was actually no real or com-
plete freedom of press in the English colonies) and that the existence
of any governmental power to choke off political criticism and agitation
is inconsistent with the concept of a democratic state and a free people.
Long before our Revolution, Blackstone 7 had written that "The Liberty
of a free press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state . . ."
Free trade and free competition in ideas were the freedoms intended
to be protected by the First Amendment. Suppression of opinions was
vicious, prior restraint on publication of such opinions was intolerable
for free men. But, even in the earlier days when Blackstone had
written his commentaries which were well known in Eighteenth
Century America, a difficulty had presented itself, and a compromise
solution had been attempted or suggested. Suppose that the publication
which could not legally be suppressed in advance, turned out to be
seditious or libelous or otherwise violative of positive law. What then
to do about it? Blackstone's answer was that while "every freeman
has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the
public" he must, nonetheless, "take the consequences of his own
temerity" if he publishes what is "improper, mischievous or illegal."
And persistent to this day is that distinction: that while ordinarily
there can be no advance restraint of publication, a publication which
cannot be restrained may nonetheless incur for its author or distributor
criminal punishment or civil liability in damages. Lord Mansfield
wrote that: "The liberty of the press consists in printing without a
license subject to the consequences of law."
Right here it would seem appropriate to stop to consider the
validity of that proposition, so confidently and frequently stated by the
enemies of censorship. Perhaps it has been adopted so completely and
finally by our courts, at least as to newspapers, that it is too late for
a retreat. But if the question still be open, and I will refer back to it
again with direct reference to obscenity, it seems to me that the asserted
rule goes too far or not far enough. If freedom of publication is as
absolute as its defenders say it is, then subsequent punishment is an
infringement of that freedom just as is prior restraint. In both cases,
the effort or at least the effect is to deter or discourage offensive publi-
cations. Of course, an injunction or a refusal to license in terms
prohibits as to the future while subsequent punishment deals with an
74 BLACKSTONE 151-2.
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act already done. But an injunction may be violated, too, and the
person enjoined may take the risk of punishment for contempt for his
violation of the injunction. Thus, neither remedy can claim absolute
efficacy, each has the same general purpose and there would seem no
logical basis for holding one kind of sanction valid and the other
invalid. To be sure, there are some practical differences. One who is
allowed to publish and distribute but is then indicted for crime has the
dual (if dubious) advantage of having gotten his product before the
public and then of being protected by a jury of his fellow citizens from
unjust conviction. To be fair, there is, too, another valid distinction
between restraint and punishment, at least as to non-obscene matter.
In a given instance, the advantage to the public in seeing a particular
article may outweigh the incidental small damage to an individual's
reputation, and a post-publication civil libel suit might be a better all-
round remedy than prevention of publication. Not so, however, as to
obscene" production, a public rather than a private wrong.
However, so that we may progress in our presentation, we will for
the present assume the American law to be, as to publications not
obscene or involving clear and present danger but otherwise unlawful,
that prior restraint is unconstitutional.
Now back to our first question: is prior restraint of obscene pub-
lications unconstitutional? The Supreme Court on at least four occa-
sions seems to have been forced to, or to have found a way to, keep
the question open. In the famous 1931 case of Near v. Minnesota,8
the court suggested that "prior restraint might be legal as against
obscene publications." In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,9 the court's
opinion 'pointed out that there are certain classes of speech the preven-
tion and punishment of which have never been thought to reach any
constitutional question, and among those classes the opinion included
the lewd and obscene. Similarly an opinion by justice Frankfurter in
Beuharmain v. Illinois, °0 seems to say, as he did in his dissent in the
Winters case, that obscene speech is not within the area of constitu-
tional protection. In the Doubleday case,1" a criminal prosecution for
the publication of "Memoirs of Hecate County" the Supreme Court
had a real opportunity to set all this at rest, since no other question
was in the case. But the eight justices who sat divided 4-to-4 and,
as is the custom in such situations, there was no announcement as to
who voted which way.
In both the Near and the LaRonde litigations we had real prior
restraints, that is, censorship, in one instance of a newspaper and in
the other of a motion picture. If the Supreme Court did not in either
8 283 U.S. 697.
9315 U.S. 568.
10343 U.S. 250, 266.
11297 N.Y. 687, 335 U.S. 848 (1948).
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case reach the question of constitutionality of prior restraint of ob-
scenity, it did indicate in each that such restraints were not necessarily
and per se invalid. To my mind, that must be so. Let us start with a
few fundamentals. I assume the concept of obscenity, that is, that some
things are indecent, lewd, offensive to decency. Tests, definitions and
standards we will talk about later, but unless you agree that the word
"obscene" has meaning, we have no common ground at all. Next, I
will assume that a prime and proper function of government is to
protect its citizens, or such of them as need protection, against pollution
and harm from physical objects, against poisons and dangerous and
offensive nuisances. I have never been able to understand why similar
protection against the impact of filthy books should be unconstitutional.
I think that protection of public morals through the established in-
strumentalities of government is a proper subject for the exercise of
the police power.
Actually, it is easy to prove that the legitimate protection of public
morals has always been a valid objective for state statutes. Examples
of such statutes, upheld despite complaints of unconstitutionality, are
those regulating gambling, prostitution, intoxicating liquors, marriage,
divorce, polygamy, commercial frauds, Sunday observance, working
hours of women and children, rec. etc. Volumes could be written
about the basis and necessity for such a legislative power, but Justice
Swayne in Trist v. Child 2 in 1874 said it all in eleven words: "The
foundation of a republic is the virtue of its citizens."
That there is an organized trade in smut is obvious enough. Two
illustrations will suffice. In 1954, the NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE
COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE PUBLICATION or ComIcs displayed a col-
lection of widely-circulated so-called "comic books" which literally
opened the eyes of those of us who do not keep in touch with that
particular genre. Intended for children and adolescents, these wildly
lurid picture stories regaled the reader with violence cum sex. In 1935
in New York City injunctions were obtained under a state statute,
against the further sale of a sort of magazine called "Nights of
Horror," the contents of which did not belie the title. These, it would
seem, were intended as adult or late-adolescent fare, since separate
copies were sold at from $2 to $4. New York, like every other state
and the Federal government, has applicable criminal obscenity statutes.
But prosecution under those criminal laws not only comes after the
event, but criminal prosecution means that every bookseller has his
separate jury trial with probable divergent results depending on the
moods and mores of jurors. Meanwhile, distribution must go merrily
on, I suppose. Prior restraint by injunction, on the other hand, would,
if obeyed, stop the sale and a judgment in one such case would, I
1288 U.S. 441, 450 (1874).
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assume, be the law not of the particular sale transaction or as to the
individual seller but would adjudge the obscenity of the book itself.
Some kind of distinction is attempted here by some theorists in that,
so they say, an injunction against further sale of magazines already
on the newsstands is something different and perhaps constitutionally
less bad than an injunction (as in the Near case) against further
publication of succeeding issues. I see no difference at all.
There is little, if anything, in legal history to provide a direct
answer to the question of whether the First Amendment was intended
to have any relation to obscenity. There is, as we shall show, a con-
siderable history as to obscenity laws and prosecutions in seventeenth-
century England and eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century
United States. But we simply do not find a definite answer as to
whether the authors and advocates of the Amendment (submitted as
the Third but adopted as the First) intended to guarantee freedom for
anything more than expression of ideas and opinions as distinguished
from fiction, fantasy or pornography. At least from 172713 the publi-
cation of an obscene book, picture or article was a common law crime
in England. In making that categorical statement I am not unaware
that some few learned writers state the contrary. They attempt to
prove from an examination of the English eighteenth century ob-
scenity indictments, trials and judgments, or the few they find of
record, that obscenity as such was not punishable, but only such
obscenity as was sacreligious, blasphemous or seditious or which
which caused a breach of the peace. But, I think, these learned scholars
are reasoning from specific cases to too-general conclusions. What
these cases (like the prosecutions of Read, Curl, Sedley and John
Wilkes) mean to me is that standards of public morality were low and
that obscenity, while a common law crime, did not actually bring an
offender to book unless his speech or antics discredited government or
the established church. Similarly, I think certain statements appearing
in Lord Auckland's PRINCIPLES OF PENIAL LAW and Hawkin's PLEAS
TO THE CROWN (both late eighteenth century) mean not that obscenity
was not a crime but that it took a lot to make out obscenity in that day.
I have examined with care such reports as are available (LLOYD'S
CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER and GALES and SEATONS' HISTORY OF DE-
BATES IN CONGRESS) of the proceedings in Congress which initiated
the submission to the States of the Bill of Rights in the form of
Amendments to the Federal Constitution. Nowhere do I find in the
meagre references to what is now the First Amendment any suggestion
that Congress meant to protect anything more than free expression by
the people and the press on subjects which interested them. I think
13 Curl's case, 2 Strange 789.
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the whole tenor of those discussions runs against the idea that freedom
of expression in fiction or pictorial art was in the minds of the Con-
gressmen or the people whom the Congressmen represented and who
were demanding a more specific and complete statement in their
Great Charter of what they considered to be fundamental rights beyond
the reach or control of government. The most definite indication of
intent I find is in the form of the freedom of speech and press provision
as first proposed by Madison, its leading spokesman. It then read as
follows:
"The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to
to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the free-
dom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall
be inviolable."
The ideas there put forward were never changed, but only form and
style. Those ideas are, I submit, unrelated to obscene books or pictures.
I find further support in the fact that this draft of the "free speech
and free press" amendment was, in Madison's original proposal, im-
mediately followed by and coupled with this proposed amendment:
"The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling
and consulting for their common good; nor from applying to
the Legislature by petitions or remonstrances, for redress of their
grievances."
Thus, we find Madison, spokesman for those who demanded a forth-
right statement in the Constitution itself of the people's rights, proposing
as one amendment in several parts a prohibition against abridgement
of religious belief, a prohibition against the establishment of a national
religion, a prohibition against infringement of the right of conscience,
a prohibition against restraint of free speech or of the press, or of
peaceful assembly and petition. It is a distortion of that simple idea,
I suggest, to say that the Constitution as thus amended forbade prior
restraint of indecent writings. That obscenity was a common law crime
in America when our Constitution was adopted cannot reasonably be
denied.1 4 The American colonists fought their Revolutionary war to
secure for themselves the rights of Englishmen. Since there was in
common-law England no "freedom of the press" for obscenity and
since the guarantees of our constitution are to be interpreted in the
sense they had acquired at common-law, since the colonists were in-
sisting on the rights of English freemen, is it over-simplification to say
that our constitutional guarantees of "freedom of the press" had simply
nothing whatever to do with indecent writings? It has never been
claimed, so far as I know, that the constitution abolished this common
law criminal liability for obscenity. Indeed, in Robertson v. Baldwin,1 5
14 Winters case, 333 U.S. 507.
15 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
[Vol. 40
LEGAL PROBLEMS IN CENSORING
decided in 1897, the Supreme Court came close to saying this when it
spoke as follows:
"The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amendments
to the Constitution, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were
not intended to lay down any novel principles of government,
but simply to embody certain guarantees and immunities which
we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had
from time immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized
exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. In incorpor-
ating these principles into the fundamental law there was no
intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to be
recognized as if they had been formally expressed." Thus, "the
freedom of speech and of the press does not permit the publica-
tion of libels, blasphemous or other indecent articles, or other
publications injurious to morals or private reputation."
Censorship laws and their advocates may be railed at and ridiculed,
their oppressive effects on creative literature may be stressed, conven-
tional tests of obscenity may be denounced-it is still a non-sequitur that
obscenity laws, preventive or punitive, are inconsistent with the Federal
Constitution.
Actually, the United States government has from its first days exer-
cised an elaborate censorship of material submitted to it for carriage
through the mails, and the Supreme Court has through the years recog-
nized the right of Congress to exclude from the mail matters injurious
to the public. In Ex parte Jackson,16 decided in 1877, the Supreme
Court held constitutional a statute which declared information con-
cerning lotteries to be non-mailable, on the theory that Congress has
the right to regulate the postal system, has the right to designate what
shall be carried in the mail and conversely the right to designate what
shall be excluded from the mails. However, the court recognized re-
strictions on the regulating power of Congress :-freedom from unrea-
sonable search and seizure of sealed mail and freedom of the press
(p. 733). Discussing that statute, the court said:
"All that Congress meant by this act was that the mail should not
be used to transport such corrupting publications and articles,
and that anyone who attempted to use it for that purpose should
be punished" (p. 736).
The Court referred to the forerunner of present Section 1461, Title
18, U.S.C.A. which declared "that no obscene, lewd, or lascivious book,
... shall be carried in the mail" and said:
"In excluding various articles from the mail, the object of Con-
gress has not been to interfere with the freedom of the press, or
with any other rights of the people; but to refuse its facilities for
1696 U.S. 727 (1877).
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the distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public morals"
(p. 736).
The right of Congress to exclude matter from the mail has been
reasserted by the Supreme Court many times since the Jackson case.
Some of the cases are: In re Rapier,17 where a conviction for placing in
the mail newspapers containing advertisements of the Louisiana State
lottery was upheld; American School of Magnetic Healing v. Mc-
Anulty, 18 where an injunction was sought against a Postmaster who
was returning mail to senders stamped "Fraud"; Public Clearing House
v. Coyne,19 where in a "chain letter" scheme the Postmaster General
denied the use of the mail to the group and seized all of its letters;
Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson,20 where the Postmaster General,
after a hearing, revoked the second-class mail privilege of a newspaper
for violating provisions of the Espionage Law.
In Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.,-" decided in 1946, the Supreme Court
held that the Postmaster General, upon a finding that Esquire Magazine,
while not obscene, did not meet the requirements of second-class mail
because it was not a publication which was making a "special contribu-
tion to the public welfare" within the meaning of the CLASSIFICATION
ACT OF 1879, could not revoke Esquire's second-class mail permit. The
court so held on the ground that Congress did not intend that an appli-
cant for a second-class postal rate "must convince the Postmaster Gen-
eral that his publication positively contributes to the public good or
public welfare" (p. 157), and on the further ground that "a requirement
that literature or art conform to some norm prescribed by an official
smacks of an ideology foreign to our system" (p. 158). Justice Douglas
writing for the court, said: "The validity of the obscenity laws is recog-
nition that the mails may not be used to satisfy all tastes, no matter how
perverted. But Congress has left the Postmaster General with no power
to prescribe standards for the literature or the art which a mailable
periodical disseminates" (p. 158).
The censorship question in postal regulation is pointed up by the
following paragraph in the Esquire opinion:
"We may assume that Congress has a broad power of classifica-
tion and need not open second-class mail to publications of all
types. The categories of publications entitled to that classifica-
tion have indeed varied through the years. And the court held
in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, that Congress could constitu-
tionally make it a crime to send fraudulent or obscene material
through the mails. But grave constitutional questions are immedi-
ately raised once it is said that the use of the mails is a privilege
17 143 U.S. 110.
is 187 U.S. 94.
'i 194 U.S. 497.
20 255 U.S. 407.
21327 U.S. 146.
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which may be extended or withheld on any grounds whatsoever.
See the dissents of Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes
in Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 421-
423, 430-432, 437-438. Under that view the second-class rate
could be granted on condition that certain economic or political
ideas not be disseminated. The provisions of the Fourth condition
would have to be far more explicit for us to assume that Con-
gress made such a radical departure from our traditions and
undertook to clothe the Postmaster General with the power to
supervise the tastes of the reading public of the country" (p. 1-5-
156) (see note 18, p. 156).
Swearingen v. U.S.22 contains a definition of "obscene," "lewd,"
and "lascivious." That case involved a prosecution on a charge of
placing in the mail a newspaper containing an "obscene, lewd and
lascivious" article. The court said:
"The words 'obscene,' 'lewd' and 'lascivious,' as used in the
statute, signify that form of immorality which has relation to
sexual impurity, and have the same meaning as is given them
at common law in prosecution for obscene libel."
The court found the newspaper article vulgar.
"But we cannot perceive in it anything of a lewd, lascivious and
obscene tendency, calculated to corrupt and debauch the mind
and morals of those into whose hands it might fall."
In United States v. Limehouse,23 a prosecution under Section 211
of CRIMINAL CODE containing words "obscene, lewd or lascivious and
every filthy book," etc., (same adjectives used in Title 18, section 1461,
U.S.C.), it was held that amendment so as to include "filthy" brought
in a new category so that the rule of the Swearingen case as to "obscene,
lewd and lascivious" did not apply and letters plainly relating to sexual
matters were "filthy."
The UNITED STATES CUSTOMS LAws as well as the POST OFFICE
LAw authorizes the banning of obscene books and there are many
Federal cases construing and applying these Custom laws as to ob-
scenity. Since what we have said above as to the Post Office statutes
establish that the words "obscene" and "obscenity" have been similarly
construed and applied by the Supreme Court, it is unnecessary here to
analyze court treatment of those same words in the CusTom LAws.
While it is still true that the Supreme Court has never given a flat
"yes" or "no" to the question of whether prior restraint is ever consti-
tutional, there is in the famous "Miracle case" 24 the strongest kind of
intimation that censorship of films as obscene is constitutionally licit.
Our court (N.Y. Court of Appeals) as a group saw The Miracle ex-
hibited in Albany and surely it was a dull, drab picture to stir up such
22161 U.S. 446, 451 (1895).
23285 U.S. 424 (1932).
24 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
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a fuss about. Filmed in Italy, it was the story of a simple-minded
peasant girl who was seduced or raped by a stranger whom the girl
in her clouded mind thought to be St. Joseph. When the girl is seen
to be pregnant the villagers deride and mock her because she seems to
think that she has conceived by some miracle. The New York movie
censorship law (SECTION 122 OF THE EDUCATION LAW) directs the
motion picture division to issue a license unless the film or a part thereof
is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacreligious or is of such a
character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to
crime. When The Miracle opened in New York City there was a great
hue and cry, and the License Division which had previously licensed
the film withdrew the license after further hearings, on the ground that
the picture was sacreligious. The New York courts upheld this ban.
The United States Supreme Court, however, thought otherwise. First,
the Court made the holding, intimated but not announced in previous
decisions, that the First Amendment's "freedom of the press" included
motion pictures. Then the court turned its attention to the legality of
New York's refusal to license The Miracle. The majority of the court
was careful to point out that the Constitution does not require "abolute
freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and
at all places." Nonetheless, the refusal to license The Miracle was held
invalid solely because the denial of license was on the ground that the
picture was "sacreligious." The outstanding importance for us of The
Miracle decision in the Supreme Court is the court's caveat that it was
not deciding "whether a state may censor motion pictures under a
clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of
obscene films." In other words, the Supreme Court came very close
to saying "obscene" is a proper standard for censorship of motion pic-
tures. It is significant that all nine of the justices concurred in this
opinion, although there were two concurring opinions. However, two
years later when the censorship of two more banned films was before
the Supreme Court, Justices Douglas and Black stated their separate
view that any and all censorship of motion pictures is absolutely uncon-
stitutional. Thus it would appear that of the seven justices now on the
court who took part in the 1952 and the 195425 decisions, five are com-
mitted to the idea that censorship for obscenity is not per se unconsti-
tutional. While the two dissenting judges in those cases wrote an opinion
in which they stated their own belief that all censorship is unconstitu-
tional, the majority contented itself with the simple statement that the
judgements below were reversed on the authority of the Burstyn case.
The picture refused license in Ohio was "M" and Ohio had rejected
it with a statement that it was "harmful" and would increase crime,
25 Superior Films v. Ohio, and Commercial Pictures v. New York, 346 U.S.
587 (1954).
[Vol. 40
LEGAL PROBLEMS IN CENSORING
etc. The New York picture which the Supreme Court held could not
be refused a license was La Ronde. La Ronde was a light, frivolous
French product portraying several episodes of illicit amorous adventure.
It had been barred by the New York censors not as being "obscene"
but because, so said the New York motion picture division, it was
"immoral" and would "tend to corrupt morals." I suppose the cryptic
statement in 1954 of the Supreme Court of its reasons for upsetting
the New York and Ohio determinations meant that in each instance
the standard applied was too vague. Perhaps New York's mistake was
that it did not term this picture "obscene" since the novel from which
it was adapted had itself been the subject of a criminal prosecution for
obscenity resulting in a conviction which was upheld by the New York
court in People v. Pesky.26 But the New York censors had used instead
the statutory term "immoral." The New York censors may have noticed
that the word "immoral" in some form was in several other state censor-
ship statutes, and that the very word "immoral" in the Ohio censorship
law had apparently been treated as sufficiently definite for such purposes
in Mutual Filn Corp. v. Ohio.2 7 Perhaps the New York censors had
read the many decisions of many courts recognizing the existence in our
society of a definite moral code. They might even have been impressed
by the statement of the Supreme Court itself in Zorach,28 that "We are
a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."
However, the Supreme Court seems to have told us the words "sacri-
ligious," "immoral" and the Ohio word "harmful" are too vague and
indefinite to express constitutional standard. In fairness, I must admit
my own court and I myself, contributed to the result in the Supreme
Court in the La Ronde case by differing among ourselves (on the New
York Court of Appeals) as to whether the word "immoral" in the New
York statute referred to sexual morality only or to a general code of
morals. We must await with patience the issuance of a definitive ruling
by the Supreme Court as to whether there may be censorship of movies
as obscene, but I do not see how the opponents of censorship find any
real comfort in these latest decisions of the highest court.
There is still another United States Supreme Court decision as to
motion picture censorship which must be noticed briefly and while this
one is the latest of all having been decided on October 24, 1955, it
certainly does not, to my mind at least, settle anything or clear up any
confusion heretofore existing. The case was Holinby Productions v.
Vaughn,29 where the United States Supreme Court unanimously re-
versed a decision of the Supreme Court of Kanss..0 The picture in-
263254 N.Y. 373.
27236 U.S. (1915).
28343 U.S. 313.
29 350 U.S. 870.
30 282 P.2d 412.
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volved was The Moon Is Blue, adapted from the Broadway play of the
same name. The Kansas censors banned it, variously stating that its was
a "sex theme throughout" and further that "the Board has found that
film to be obscene, indecent and immoral and such as tend to debase
or corrupt morals." The Supreme Court, in reversing, wrote nothing
except a one-line opinion which said that the reversal was on the author-
ity of the Burstyn and Superior cases. Where that leaves the law I
frankly do not know. The best guess I can offer is that the Supreme
Court upset the censorship ban in Kansas either because the Kansas
censors seemed to be saying that they would ban any movie that con-
cerned itself principally with sex or that the Supreme Court thought
that the Kansas authorities were applying some too-vague concept that
the picture might "tend to debase or corrupt morals."
What is "obscene"? What does "obscenity" reasonably mean in
American law? The first recorded criminal conviction in the United
States for the sale of an obscene book was that of Holmes3 ' in 1821,
just thirty years after the Bill of Rights had become effective. Since
then, there have been many such criminal prosecutions, especially in
Massachusetts and New York, dealing with such diverse literary pro-
ducts as Glyn's Three Weeks, Dreiser's American Tragedy, Lawrence's
Lady Chatterly's Lover, the Arabian Nights, the Works of Rabelais,
The Decameron, Tom Jones, Joyce's Ulysses, and many another. It is
safe to say that in every single one of these prosecutions there was
involved in some fashion the famous Hicklin test for obscenity pro-
nounced by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, Court of Queen's Bench, in
Regina v. Hicklin,3 a prosecution under the famous LORD CAMPBELL'S
AcT OF 1857. The Hicklin decision came down in 1868, which by coinci-
dence was the same year in which New York enacted its first criminal
obscenity statute. Today, almost all the American states have obscenity
laws. It is safe, too, to say that no judicial language ever uttered has
been more thoroughly analyzed or more bitterly excoriated. The Hicklin
test, formulated by the immediate successor to Lord Campbell in the
Chief Justiceship, is: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may
fall." The same idea is expressed in a Massachusetts statute 3 enacted
in 1771 and still on the books, which makes it a crime to sell a writing
"which is obscene, indecent or impure, or manifestly tends to corrupt
the morals of youth." The NEW YORK PENAL LAW (section 1141)
in effect for almost 70 years puts it more simply when it condemns
"any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting book."
3117 Mass. 336 (1821).
32L.R. 3 Q.B. 359 (1868).
33 ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASS., C. 272, §28, Vol. 9.
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Objections to that test readily suggest themselves. Opponents of censor-
ship say that the I-icklin formula permits a book to be condemned be-
cause of isolated passages regardless of its total purpose and effect; that
it does not consider whether the subject work has attained an accepted
place in literature or art; that if the subject is a new work, that the
Hicklin test ignores the opinions of competent critics; that the effect
of the book or picture should be measured not by its impact on one
particular class but upon all whom it is likely to reach. The Hicklin
theory of obscenity rigidly applied would, it is asserted, brand as ob-
scene the Bible, Shakespeare and most of the great fiction classics of our
language. It would, say its enemies, proscribe many a medical treatise
and any book of sex education. A possible compromise with the rigidity
of the Hicklin rule is found in the Federal Court opinion34 dealing with
Ulysses which says that the standard "must be the likelihood that the
work will so much arouse the salacity of the reader to whom it is sent
as to outweigh any literary, scientific or other merit it may have in that
reader's hands; of this, the jury is the arbiter."
Not only do those who inveigh against the Hicklin rule brand it as
stupid and unworkable but they point to many court decisions especially
in New York to back up their assertion that the rule is no longer actually
applied. I do not pretend to have analyzed the reported cases in all 48
states, but I do claim familiarity with those of New York, the state
which is the center of the publishing business on all its levels, including,
sadly, the very lowest levels of that trade. My considered opinion is that
Hicklin is still the decisional law of New York but that there have been
engrafted onto its simple framework some necessary, logical and moder-
ating exceptions or explanations. Generally, those exceptions are: that
the rule does not apply to works of thoroughly and long recognized
literary merit, that a work is not necessarily obscene because it contains
exotically stimulating passages so long as its general purpose, scheme
and effect is not merely smut for smut's sake; and that the necessities
of education and the progress of learning must except entirely from
the rule's operation a large class of educational books, the exact content
of that class not being measurable but to be determined in justice and
reason, case by case. I confess" that I see nothing absurd or benighted
about leaving the law in such a state. No book has a brother, and it is,
I think, beyond human ingenuity to devise a legal text for obscenity so
precise that it can be laid alongside a book or picture for comparison
with an automatic mathematical result made instantly available. The
law does not claim to be an exact science. It is a set of behavioral rules
applied by human judges to human acts. Even theologians differ.
In the standard collection of judicial definitions found in the work
entitled "Words and Phrases" there are several pages of quotations
34 83 F.2d 158.
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of judicial language attempting to explain and interpret the words
obscene and obscenity. At first glance these definitions seem hopelessly
prolix, contradictory and vague. Various courts have said that matter
is obscene which has a "libidinous effect" or is the expression of "some-
thing which decency forbids to be expressed" or it is "shocking to
public taste" or "filthy" or "offensive to fastidity or modesty" or "tends
to corrupt the morals of youth." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY has an
omnibus definition or set of definitions including "lewd, impure, inde-
cent, repulsive, filthy, offensive to modesty or chastity, calculated to
shock the moral sense of men by a disregard of chastity or modesty" etc.
Actually, the word "obscene" seems to be one of those labels not uncom-
monly used in the law (like due process or fair trial or reasonable care).
It defies technically complete and exact definition but expresses a
generally recognized and implied concept that must be applied case by
case reasonably and honestly. In People v. Muller,35 decided in 1884,
the New York Court of Appeals commented that the New York statute
does not undertake to define obscene or indecent pictures or publications,
but, said the court: "The words used in the statute are themselves de-
scriptive. They are words in common use, and every person of ordinary
intelligence understands their meaning, and readily and in most cases
accurately applies them to any object or thing brought to his attention
which involves a judgment as to the quality indicated. It does not require
an expert in art or literature to determine whether a picture is obscene
or whether printed words are offensive to decency or good morals. These
are matters which fall within the range of ordinary intelligence, and
the jury does not require to be informed by an expert pronouncing on
them." In other words, a decision as to whether something is so indecent
as to merit prohibition is one of those judgments which every reasonable
person makes for himself in the ordinary business of living. The
Supreme Court, a few years after the Muller case, expressed much the
same thought when it said this in an opinion by Justice Harlan, grand-
father of the present Justice Harlan:
"Everyone who uses the mails of the United States for carrying
papers or publications must take notice of what, in this enlight-
ened age is meant by decency, purity, and chastity in social life,
and what must be deemed obscene, lewd, and lascivious." 36
Fifty years later in the Winters3 7 case the Supreme Court took the
trouble to describe as apt words for a permissible statute those found in
Section 1141, Penal Law: "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent
or disgusting . . . ". The rule and the test then is one of reason. It
rejects as obscene such truly and intrinsically fiilthy material as repre-
3596 N.Y. 408, 411 (1884).36Rosen v. U.S., 161 U.S. 29, 42 (1896).
37 Supra, note 14 at p. 520.
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sentatious and descriptious of unnatural sex acts. It bans also, following
Hicklin, publications which, read as a whole, have a tendency to deprave
and corrupt the immature mind.
In seeking to work out a useful definition of obscenity it is instructive
to turn to Canon Law. In so doing we discover first that the Canon
Law, like our own modern American law, finds it impossible or un-
necessary to set up a mechanical or strait-jacketing definition of ob-
scenity. But the writings of the great Catholic authorities on moral
theology abound with interpretations of the phrase "impure or obscene
matters" which appears in the code of Canon Law. When we look at
some of these Canon Law interpretations we are struck by their simi-
larity to the Hicklin case test. For a book to be prohibited for obscenity,
say the theologians, it is necessary that from the whole tenor thereof,
the author's intentions seem to be to teach the reader about the sins of
impurity and arouse him to libidinousness. It is the principal purpose
of the author and the principal scope of the book that is sought for.
Father Vermeersch, a great Jesuit writer on sex morality, says that an
obscene nude is a nude that allures. Another Jesuit writer, Father
Gerald Kelly, says that for literature or theatrical productions to be
obscene two elements are required; first, that the theme or content is
of an impure or sexually inviting nature, and second, that the manner
of presentation is such as to throw an active emphasis on that impure
or sexually exciting element. He says that a book or play about adultery
is not necessarily obscene but when a book or play not only centers
about adultery but portrays it in an attractive manner, then it must be
called obscene. As Father Harold C. Gardiner, still another Jesuit, points
out in a paper published last year in LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROB-
LEMS, the emphasis in Canon Law is always on the tendency of the book
or work of art to exude some sort of allure that panders to the passions
of sex. Thus the elements are themselves objective and the intentions
of the author or artist are expressed externally in the work itself. In
this sense there are objective norms by which obscenity can be dis-
covered. Father Gardiner, too, has noticed the marked correspondence
between this test and that of the Hicklin case. The substance of the
Hicklin test and that of the Catholic Canon Law experts' test is in the
end the same, that is, as to whether the work under investigation depicts
filthy sex matters or has a tendency to stimulate sexual passion. Father
Gardiner sums up his discussion with the statement: "Any object which
per se tends to rouse the sexual passions is obscene." The canonists
offer us a warning which, if heeded, would help to dissipate some of
the natural fear and distaste of Americans toward censorship. The
canonists tell us that all restrictive legislation is to be interpreted at its
minimum extent, that is, that human liberty is to be curtailed just as little
as possible in the achievement of the ends of particular legislation.
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Canon Law, like our modern civil law, admits its failure to give an abso-
lutely certain and mechanically applicable definition. Every determina-
tion must be a matter of careful and prudent judgment.
In seeking a viable solution for the problem of censorship by law in
a democratic society, we must eschew extremes and shun the extremists.
We share the views neither of those who picture all censors as blue-nose
kill-joy meddlers choking off artistic expression, nor of those who at the
other extreme condemn all nudes as obscene and all mention of sex as
sinful. We talk the language of law based on reason and justice. Gone
is the old star chamber which "once exercised the power of cutting off
the ears, branding the foreheads, and slitting the noses of the libellers
of important personages."' 3' No modern American judges I know have
any intention of following the example of Chief Justice Scroggs who
took it upon himself (and his Court of King's bench) to prohibit the
publication of a periodical purporting to describe the doings of the
Papacy. There is no danger at all that any censorship in this country
would dare to enjoin the publication of anything remotely resembling
a newspaper or periodical of information or opinion. Everyone recog-
nizes that on a balancing of good and bad, interfering with a free
press is a much worse evil than any that result from complete freedom
of the press. We agree with Thomas Jefferson that as to the general
content of newspapers, interference is the worst of all evils, since "our
liberty depends upon the freedom of the press, and that cannot be
limited without being lost." But obscenity, real, serious, not imagined
or puritanically exaggerated, is today as in all the past centuries, a
public evil, a public nuisance, a public pollution. When its effective
control requires censorship, I see no reason why democratic govern-
ment should not use democratic processes on a high administrative level,
under the control of the courts, to suppress such obscenity.
3 8 Brandeth v. Lana, 8 Paiges Chancery Reports 24 (N.Y., 1839).
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